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Abstract:  
There exists a long standing debate between foundationalism and coherentism in 
epistemology. To resolve this debate, Susan Haack argues for a third, alternative 
theory—foundherentism—that incorporates the good elements of both foundationalism 
and coherentism while avoiding their shortcomings. It incorporates the foundationalist 
view that experiential input is necessary for empirical justification. And it incorporates 
the coherentist view that all beliefs can be justified in virtue of their mutually supportive 
relationships with other beliefs. 
 The debate between foundationalism and coherentism extends to moral 
epistemology. I will employ the same sort of strategy in an attempt to resolve this 
intractable dispute. I will construct and defend an alternative theory—moral 
foundherentism—and argue that it incorporates the good elements of moral 
foundationalism (intuitionism) as well as moral coherentism (the method of reflective 
equilibrium) while avoiding their shortcomings. The proposed theory incorporates the 
moral foundationalist view that intuitive input is necessary in order for moral beliefs to be 
justified to any degree. And it accommodates the moral coherentist view that all moral 
beliefs can be justified in virtue of their mutually supportive relationships with other 
(moral and non-moral) beliefs.  
.  
Key terms: Epistemology, Moral Epistemology, Justification, Ethics, Metaethics, 
Intuition, Knowledge 
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In moral philosophy, it is common practice to consult moral intuitions in 
developing theories and in arguing for the rightness or wrongness of particular kinds of 
actions. In some ways, moral intuition plays an analogous role in moral theorizing to that 
played by observation in scientific theorizing. Scientific theories are unjustified if they 
are not based in observation. Likewise, it is difficult to see how a moral theory can be 
justified without being based in moral intuition. Intuitions constrain theory acceptance 
and are the “data” from which theories (in part) are developed. 
 To the extent philosophers agree on anything, they agree that moral intuitions are 
an indispensable part of moral theorizing. There is significant disagreement, however, on 
the exact justificatory role that intuitions play. On one hand, foundationalists claim moral 
beliefs must be derived from basic, intuitive moral propositions (e.g., general principles 
or particular moral judgments). On the other hand, coherentists claim that intuitions are 
only a starting place; they are provisional and revisable. For the coherentist, the actual 
justification for holding any particular moral belief comes only after one’s intuitive 
beliefs and other (moral or non-moral) beliefs are made to reciprocally support one 
another by “hanging together” properly.  
There also exists a long standing debate between foundationalism and 
coherentism in empirical epistemology. To settle this debate, Susan Haack argues for a 
third, alternative theory—foundherentism. She argues that foundherentism incorporates 
the best elements of both foundationalism and coherentism while avoiding their 
shortcomings. It accommodates the foundationalist view that experiential input is 
necessary for empirical justification, and it accommodates the coherentist view that each 
and every one of an agent’s beliefs can (and probably should) be justified by their 
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mutually supportive relationships with other beliefs. 
 Here I will employ Haack’s strategy in moral epistemology. I will outline and 
defend a third, alternative theory—moral foundherentism—and argue that it 
accommodates the good elements of moral foundationalism (intuitionism) and moral 
coherentism (the method of reflective equilibrium) while avoiding their problems. It 
accommodates the moral foundationalist view that intuitive input is necessary for the 
justification of moral beliefs, and it accommodates the moral coherentist idea that each of 
our moral beliefs can and should also be justified by their mutually supportive 
relationships with other (moral and non-moral) beliefs. These two claims are consistent 
with one another and a theory which combines them is better than either a purely 
foundationalist or a purely coherentist theory of moral epistemology. According to moral 
foundherentism, intuitions play a parallel role to that played by experiences in empirical 
foundherentism. 
In the first section, I will sketch and contrast two standard conceptions of the 
structure of epistemic justification—foundationalism and coherentism—and give reasons 
for thinking that both theories are unsatisfactory. In section two, I will describe how these 
theories apply to the structure of justification of moral beliefs and show that both theories 
rely on moral intuitions. I will also show that these theories have similar problems as 
their non-moral counterparts. In the third section, I will describe the alternative, 
foundherentist approach to empirical justification. Finally, in the fourth section, I will 
outline and argue for a moral analogue of empirical foundherentism.  
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1.  Epistemic Justification in General 
What does it mean for an agent, S, to be justified in believing some proposition, 
p? One sense of ‘justified’ entails that S is justified in believing that p if and only if 
believing that p is in S’ best interests. This is to say that S is prudentially justified in 
believing that p. Another sense of ‘justified’ entails that S is justified in believing that p 
only if S has adequate reasons or evidence for believing that p. This is to say that S is 
epistemically justified in believing that p is true. 
Prudential justification has an agent’s best interest as its aim; epistemic 
justification has truth as its aim. To see this distinction, consider the following situation. I 
am gravely ill. However, I know that the probability of my survival would increase if I 
were to believe that I will survive. In this situation, it would clearly be prudent of me to 
believe that I will survive. Yet in order to know that believing that I will survive would 
increase probability of my survival, I need epistemic justification. An agent’s prudential 
justification for believing relies on a notion of epistemic justification in situations where 
the agent needs to know that something is in his interests in order to intentionally act to 
serve his interests. (All practical action relies on a notion of epistemic justification in an 
exactly analogous fashion.) This indicates the primacy of epistemic justification to 
prudential justification.  
While an S’ epistemic justification for believing that p is tied to the truth of p, it is 
important to notice that S can be justified yet mistaken. That is, S can be epistemically 
justified in believing that p is true even if p is actually false. This is because S’ 
justification for the belief that p simply indicates the greater likelihood of p’s truth. 
Justified mistakes are possible because one can have good reasons or evidence for 
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thinking that false propositions are true (and for thinking that true propositions are false). 
For example, take my belief that there are five beers in my refrigerator. This belief is 
justified because I know that I bought a six-pack yesterday and that only drank one beer. 
However, unbeknownst to me, someone burglarized my house while I was away and took 
a beer on the way out. Despite the fact that there are actually only four beers in the 
refrigerator, my belief that there are five beers in the refrigerator remains justified until I 
happen to look in the refrigerator and notice a beer missing.  
We have said that justification is a matter of the evidence or reasons one has to 
believe that a proposition is true. But what counts as evidence or a reason? Thus far we 
have characterized justification in terms of inferences from other known propositions. My 
belief that there are five beers in my refrigerator is justified in that I infer it from my 
beliefs that I bought six last night, that I drank one, and that six beers minus one beer 
equals five beers. My justification for the belief that there are five beers might also be 
strengthened by inferences that eliminate possible defeaters, as in inferences from the 
beliefs that I live alone and that burglaries are not common occurrences in my 
neighborhood (and that even if they were common, a burglar would not take my beer of 
all things).  
The problem with this purely inferential characterization of justification is that it 
is impossible for all of an agent’s beliefs to be inferentially justified. Each belief that 
serves as inferential evidence for another belief would need its own inferential evidence. 
So, if all justification were inferential, we would need an infinite number of beliefs in 
order to justify a single belief. This is a problem because as finite agents we cannot hold 
an infinite number of beliefs.  
 5 
 
To see this problem, consider the following argument—the regress of justification 
argument.
1
 First, assume that (1) all justification is inferential, and that (2) beliefs cannot 
be justified by unjustified beliefs. Assumption (1) entails that an agent’s justification for 
believing that p must consist in beliefs from which she infers p. Further assume that (3) a 
belief cannot be justifiably inferred (directly or indirectly) from itself.  In other words, 
assume that circular reasoning is unjustified. Assumptions (1)-(3) entail that, in order for 
S to be justified in believing p, S must infer p from some other belief or set of beliefs (q). 
However, assumptions (1)-(3) also apply to q. S’ belief that q must be justified in order 
for it to provide any justification for S’ belief that p. According to assumptions (1) and 
(2), q must be supported by a further belief set (r). And according to (3), r cannot include 
p or q. And (1)-(3) also apply to r; r must be inferred from a belief set which excludes r 
(t). And so on ad infinitum.  
If the regress argument is sound, none of our beliefs can be justified. So, the 
regress argument presents a problem for the common sense view that at least some of our 
beliefs are justified. It is useful to think of theories of justification as defenses of this 
common sense view and attempts to avoid the regress problem and skepticism in general. 
Of course, in order to avoid the problem, theories must show that at least one of its 
premises is false. One traditional response consists in denying (1). This view posits a 
special class of beliefs that are non-inferentially justified and maintains that the rest of 
one’s justified beliefs must be inferred from this special class of beliefs. This is the 
foundationalist response. Another response denies (3) (and perhaps (1) as well). This 
response is to say that beliefs are justified in terms of their mutually supportive 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1985): 
55 
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relationships with one another (and that mutual support is not circular reasoning). This is 
the coherentist response.  
 
1.1 Foundationalism 
Foundationalism posits two kinds of beliefs—basic and non-basic. Basic beliefs 
are non-inferentially justified and thereby provide a foundation for all other knowledge. 
Non-basic beliefs are ultimately justified by inference from basic beliefs. Hence the 
foundationalist holds that “justification by inference is conditional justification only.”2 
The justification for one’s non-basic beliefs is conditional upon one’s basic beliefs. A 
valid inference justifies the belief in some conclusion only if its premises are also 
justified. And its premises are justified only if they belong to, or are themselves inferred 
from, a special class of non-inferentially justified beliefs. If foundationalism is true, it is 
possible for finite agents (such as ourselves) to end the regress and have justified beliefs. 
Sooner or later, an agent’s chain of inferences must end with a foundational belief.  
It is easy to see why the metaphor of a foundation is used. Non-inferential (basic) 
beliefs are dubbed “foundational” because they are thought to hold all of the epistemic 
“weight” of the rest of an agent’s beliefs in the same way that the foundation of a 
building holds the weight of its entire superstructure. But what are foundational beliefs 
exactly, and how are they able to hold so much justificatory “weight?” We have said that 
they are supposed to be non-inferentially justified—but how? Classical foundationalists 
claim that basic beliefs are non-inferentially justified because they are infallible and have 
no chance of being false.
3
 For instance, many classical foundationalists of the empiricist 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 55 
3
 Ibid., 57 
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variety have claimed that beliefs about our sensory states (e.g., the belief that I am seeing 
blue now) are infallible. (They do not claim that sensory states themselves are infallible 
because one cannot infer anything from a sensory state. This is because sensory states 
lack propositional content and therefore cannot be true or false.) 
There are good reasons to doubt classical, infallibilist foundationalism. First, it is 
doubtful that infallible beliefs could have enough propositional content to justify other 
beliefs. Second, even if they were to have enough content to justify some other beliefs, 
infallible beliefs would nevertheless not have enough content to justify enough beliefs to 
truly avoid skepticism.
4
 The foundationalist is faced with a dilemma. There are two 
options for basic beliefs. They must be either (1) infallible but nearly vacuous and devoid 
of content, or (2) less rich in content but more fallible.
5
 This implies that (all things being 
equal) the more content a belief has, the higher chance it has of being false.  
To see this dilemma, consider beliefs about one’s sensory states, such as the belief 
“X appears blue.” Interpreting “X appears blue” in a way that renders it infallible would 
make it synonymous with “appears the way this thing appears to me now.” This seems 
rather certain, but it also lacks enough content to be useful as a foundational belief. On 
the other interpretation, “X appears blue” means “X appears the way blue things usually 
appear to me.” On this interpretation, the proposition has content about one’s past states 
and therefore has more content. But it is also fallible because it relies on memory (which 
is capable of error).  
If statements like “X appears blue” are interpreted in the first, infallible way, an 
agent might have an infallible foundation. She will have basic and non-basic beliefs. But 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 58 
5
 Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: a Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology, (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2009): 69-70 
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it would turn out that only a very small subset of her beliefs would be justified. Most of 
her every-day, common-sense beliefs would not be justified. The foundation obtained by 
Descartes’ methodological skepticism is a good example of such a foundation. He was 
unable to infer much from the proposition that he exists and found himself faced with 
skepticism about the external world. From knowledge of my own existence I can infer a 
few other beliefs—that something exists, for example. But this bit of knowledge 
obviously does not get me as far as I would like.  
It seems that requiring basic beliefs to be infallible leads to radical skepticism. 
But it also seems we do know many things. So, perhaps 100% certainty is not required 
after all. Notice that in order for a belief to serve as a foundation it must be (1) justified 
by something other than beliefs, (2) justified by itself, or (3) without need of 
justification.
6
  A basic belief need not be infallible in order to fulfill one of these 
conditions and do its justificatory work. Indeed, the more plausible versions of 
foundationalism attempt to fulfill (at least one of) these conditions by positing a more 
modest kind of non-inferentially justified belief. Robert Audi is a good example of a 
modest foundationalist. He claims that foundational beliefs are self-evident. Thus he 
attempts to fulfill condition (2). Audi thinks that it is possible to appeal to self-evidence 
without depending on implausible notions of infallibility.  
Audi defines a self-evident proposition as one that agent is justified in believing 
on the basis of adequate understanding alone.
7
 Given this definition, an agent can have an 
adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition without necessarily being compelled 
to believe it. It is just that if S were to believe self-evident proposition p on the basis of 
                                                 
6
 Dancy, 63 
7
 Robert Audi, “Self-Evidence,” Nous, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology (1999): 
206 
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adequate understanding, then S’ belief that p would be justified. If S does believe that p, 
that belief is an instance of knowledge. It is possible for an agent to have a perfect 
understanding of a self-evident proposition and nevertheless refrain from believing it. For 
example, a philosopher who doubts the existence of self-evident propositions might 
refrain from believing on the basis of adequate understanding alone.  
Given Audi’s conception of self-evidence, there can be uncertainty about whether 
or not the proposition at hand is actually self-evident. This uncertainty is partially a 
function of the fact that not all self-evident propositions are easily understood. To 
account for this, Audi distinguishes between immediate and mediate self-evidence.
8
 
Immediately self-evident propositions are those that are “readily understood by normal 
adults.”9 Mediately self-evident propositions, on the other hand, require a higher degree 
of reflection. Immediately self-evident propositions are more obvious and thus are more 
psychologically compelling than mediately self-evident propositions.  
The reflection required to justifiably believe a mediately self-evident proposition 
does not consist in inferring it from some other proposition. It does, however, consist in 
drawing inferences “internal to” the self-evident proposition.10 The point of reflection is 
to aid in the understanding of self-evident propositions. In other words, hard to 
understand self-evident propositions are less obvious and less compelling than more 
easily understood ones (though even easily understood self-evident propositions are not 
necessarily compelling). The more uncertain one is about whether or not one understands 
a proposition, the less likely one is to believe that proposition on the basis of adequate 
understanding alone.  
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 214 
9
 Ibid., 214 
10
 Ibid., 215 
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Simple mathematical propositions are good examples of immediately self-evident 
propositions. It is just obvious that six minus one equals five. An example of a mediately 
self-evident proposition given by Audi is this: “If there have never been any siblings then 
there never have been any first cousins.”11 In order to adequately understand this 
proposition, one might have to make the following internal inferences. If I were to have 
no siblings, then I would be a single child. And if I were to have children, then my 
children would not have aunts or uncles. It is necessary to have aunts and uncles in order 
for my children to have cousins because their cousins would be the sons or daughters of 
their aunts and uncles (which would not exist).  
Audi argues that it is possible to not know that one knows a self-evident 
proposition.
12
 This is because the justified belief in a self-evident proposition does not 
require that one knows the proposition’s self-evident status. One need not even have a 
concept of self-evidence in order to adequately understand and thus justifiably believe a 
self-evident proposition. In other words, S’ belief in the seemingly self-evident 
proposition p is defeasible in case it is not certain that p is self-evident. Perhaps if S had 
an adequate understanding of p, believed that p on the basis of this understanding, and 
had self-evident knowledge of p’s self-evident status, then S would have something close 
to infallible and certain knowledge of p. But this is obviously not required (and probably 
quite rare). 
A problem with Audi’s theory is that it is not clear that a foundation made solely 
of self-evident beliefs will be sufficient enough to support our every-day beliefs. That is, 
                                                 
11
 Robert Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics,” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997): 47 
12
 Audi (1999), 217 
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it is not clear that such a foundation will make possible the justification of enough of our 
beliefs to avoid radical skepticism. Even though self-evidence does not rely on 
infallibility, it is hard to imagine that one could infer all of one’s every day beliefs (which 
seem justified) from self-evident beliefs alone. This is another instance of Descartes’ 
problem. It seems that what explains Descartes’ failure is not only the demand for an 
infallible foundation, but also the claim to self-evidence. 
 
1.2 Coherentism 
The most interesting thing to note about the foundationalist’s response to the 
regress problem is this. Even though foundationalists deny that justification is purely 
inferential, foundationalism is nevertheless motivated by the more general assumption 
that all justification is transitive and linear.
 13
 To say that a justificatory relationship is 
transitive and linear is to say that the justification provided by one belief is transmitted, in 
a one-way fashion, to another belief (via inference, for example). Foundationalism entails 
two kinds of justified beliefs—basic and non-basic. Since foundationalist justification is 
transitive and linear, all of the justification for non-basic, derived beliefs must be 
originally contained in basic, foundational premises. The relationship between 
foundational (basic) beliefs and derived (non-basic) beliefs is the only kind of 
justificatory relationship that exists for the foundationalist. This asymmetrical 
relationship is transitive and one-way in that the justification for non-basic beliefs must 
necessarily be transmitted from basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs (and not vice versa).   
In contrast to the foundationalist, the coherentist rejects the idea that all 
                                                 
13
 Laurence BonJour, “The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,” Michael Heumer (ed.), Epistemology: 
Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002): 390-392 
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justificatory relationships are transitive and one-way. Instead, the coherentist holds that 
justification is reciprocal and non-linear.
14
 For the coherentist, a belief is justified only if 
certain logical or quasi-logical relationships of mutual support exist between that belief 
and other beliefs held by the same agent.
15
 Put simply, the coherentist holds that an 
agent’s beliefs are justified insofar as they hang together properly. Therefore, the 
coherentist needs no special class of basic beliefs from which all justification is 
transmitted. Reciprocal justification or is a sort of emergent property; it cannot be 
reduced to any special category of beliefs. It exists only when beliefs have the proper 
mutually supportive relationships with one another.  So, if coherentism is true, there 
might be hope for our every day beliefs after all.  
Logical consistency is usually thought to be a necessary relationship for 
coherence, but logical consistency is clearly not sufficient. It is possible for an agent to 
have a belief set composed of unrelated beliefs that are consistent with one another. The 
mere consistency of these unrelated beliefs does not give us any reason to think those 
beliefs are true. For this reason, coherentists appeal to further quasi-logical relations, such 
as evidential consistency, connectedness, comprehensiveness
16
 and explanatory 
coherence.
17
 A set of beliefs is evidentially consistent if “the weight of the evidence 
provided by the various beliefs in the set don’t tell, on balance, against any of the 
others.”18 Evidential consistency is described as a necessary condition for coherence in 
general as well as a sufficient condition for minimal coherence. If the weight of the 
evidence provided by the various beliefs in the set were to tell in favor of other beliefs in 
                                                 
14
 BonJour, 392 
15
 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,” in Moral Knowledge?, 166 
16
 Sayre-McCord, 167 
17
 Haack, 129 
18
 Sayre-McCord, 166 
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the set, the set is not just evidentially consistent; it is also connected. The stronger the 
supportive, evidential relationships between beliefs are, the more connected those beliefs 
are. Comprehensiveness is a matter of the number of beliefs in a set and the variety of 
different kinds of beliefs in that set. A belief set containing 1,000 beliefs of 10 different 
kinds is comprehensive than a belief set containing 100 beliefs of 5 different kinds (as 
long as the other coherence relationships in that set are not weakened).   
The skeptic might object to mutual support on the grounds that it seems like a 
kind of circular reasoning. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that fallacious reasoning is 
justified. However, mutual support should be distinguished from circular reasoning. The 
coherentist is not claiming that a belief should be used as a premise for an inference that 
establishes itself. In fact, this claim is inconsistent with coherentism because it rests on 
the assumption that justification is transitive and one-way or linear.
19
 That is, the circular 
reasoning objection rests on the mistaken view that coherentism entails that the 
justification S has for believing that p is transmitted to other beliefs and then relayed back 
to p. What the coherentist actually claims is that S’ justification for p does not exist apart 
from p’s relationship(s) with other beliefs held by S. In other words, because the 
justification in a belief set emerges from the way(s) the beliefs in that set relate to one 
another, the justification for the beliefs in that set cannot be traced back to any particular 
evidentially privileged belief(s).    
According to coherentism, it is only when an agent is concerned the justification 
of a small subset of her beliefs (i.e., at the local level) that justification seems linear and 
inferential.
20
 Hence it is only at the local, inferential level that the agent needs a 
                                                 
19
 BonJour, 390 
20
 BonJour, 391 
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“foundation” of sorts to stop a regress. That is, in order to settle an argument, we must 
reach dialectically acceptable beliefs that serve as temporary, pragmatic “foundations.” 
However, these will not be genuinely basic beliefs. They are only assumptions that are 
taken for granted in a certain context. For instance, the success of a biological experiment 
depends on the scientists’ having dialectically acceptable explanations for their findings.  
The justificatory relationships posited by the coherentist do not exist to any 
noticeable degree at the local level. The actual relationships that justify one’s beliefs exist 
in their entirety only at the holistic level. That is, in order to know the extent to which a 
belief is actually justified, one must consider the holistic doxastic context of that belief.
21
 
When beliefs are considered from the global, holistic perspective, relationships of 
evidential consistency, connectedness, comprehensiveness, and explanatory coherence 
are made apparent.  
One interesting thing to note about the holistic conception of justification is that it 
might require externalism about justification.
22
 Externalism is the view that an agent can 
have justified beliefs without knowing those beliefs to be justified and without having 
access to that justification. At the local level, justification seems to be internalist in nature 
because the agent is consciously drawing upon premises to support a given belief; hence 
the agent obviously has access to his justification. However, it does not seem that an 
agent can view his own beliefs holistically because this would require him to position 
himself “outside” of his beliefs. An agent cannot survey all of his beliefs at once (or even 
form a belief about all of his beliefs). Therefore, the agent does not have cognitive access 
to the totality of the relationships that actually justify his beliefs.  
                                                 
21
 BonJour, 391 
22
 Sayre-McCord, 147 
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One might object to the idea that the holistic conception of justification entails 
externalism by claiming that the agent does have access to all of these relationships; it is 
just that the agent does not have access to all of them at once. In other words, he has 
potential access to all of his justification, and perhaps this is all that is necessary. The 
problem with this objection is that at least some of the justification for the agent’s beliefs 
will, nevertheless, remain external to the agent at any given point in time. Hence 
coherentism does entail externalism in some sense or to some degree.  
The externalist, holistic conception of justification can solve the regress problem 
without ever evoking a regress stopper because it denies that justification is one-way. (By 
the same token, it entails that, in some sense, justification is non-inferential.) It should be 
noted, however, that the coherentist might not need to appeal to holism to solve the 
regress problem. Perhaps the coherentist can include a concept of one-way, linear 
justification as well. Along with mutually supportive justificatory relationships, the 
coherentist might posit regress stoppers in the form of permissively justified beliefs. A 
belief in some proposition is permissively justified (as opposed to positively justified or 
unjustified) in the sense that the agent has no epistemic reason to reject or accept that 
proposition. It is thought that permissively justified beliefs can provide positive 
justification for other beliefs without themselves being positively justified.
23
 Permissively 
justified beliefs are evidentially neutral. So, it is impossible to infer a permissively 
justified belief from another (justified or unjustified) belief. As soon as S infers the 
permissively justified belief that p from another justified belief that q, S’ belief that p 
ceases to be permissively justified and becomes positively justified. As soon as S infers p 
from unjustified beliefs, p ceases to be permissively justified and becomes unjustified. 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., 164 
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This makes permissive justification a linear, one-way concept. Thus permissively 
justified beliefs are potential regress stoppers. 
Despite being one-way, permissive justification differs from foundationalist 
justification in that permissive justification is not transitive. That is, permissive 
justification does not entail evidential relations that are mere “conduits of justification.”24 
Positive justification emerges from permissively justified beliefs without permissively 
justified beliefs containing any positive justification. An agent can be justified in 
believing a proposition while being justified in believing in the evidence for that 
proposition to a lesser degree. Even if S’ only reason for believing that q is her 
permissively justified belief that p, S’ belief that q will have a higher degree of 
justification than her belief that p (assuming that S has no reasons against q).  
 
2. Intuitions and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Beliefs 
Now that we have an adequate grasp of foundationalism and coherentism, we may 
consider how these theories apply to the justification of moral beliefs. A glaring feature 
of theories of moral epistemology is that they tend to rely on moral intuition. That is, the 
intuitiveness of a proposition is usually thought to play some important role in its 
justification. 
But what does it mean to say that a proposition is intuitive? We can say, at the 
very least, that intuitive justification is non-inferential. Intuitive beliefs are justified 
without needing to be derived from other beliefs. Vaguely speaking, to say that a 
proposition is intuitive is to say that it feels or seems true. Moral intuitions can be about 
particular cases as well as general principles. That it was wrong for the burglar to steal 
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my beer is an intuition about a particular case. The intuition that theft is wrong is an 
intuition about a general principle.  
It is a common practice in moral philosophy to make latent intuitions about moral 
principles explicit by means of thought experiments (i.e., imagining specific moral 
cases). Take, for example, two famous thought experiments—the axe murderer and the 
magistrate and the mob.
25
 The axe murderer thought experiment elicits intuitions against 
the Kantian principle that it is always wrong to lie. Imagine that you answer the door to 
find an angry, axe wielding man with an obvious intent to kill. The man asks you if your 
friend, Fred, is inside. You know that Fred is inside. You also know (or have good reason 
to believe) that you might have to lie in order to save your friend’s life. It seems that, in 
this situation, you probably have a duty to lie and that the principle that it is always 
wrong to lie is obviously false.  
The magistrate and the mob thought experiment elicits intuitions contrary to the 
utilitarian principle that one should always act to maximize pleasure and minimize harm. 
It consists in imagining the following situation. A mob threatens to riot if a magistrate 
does not execute a man whom they have accused of committing some heinous crime. 
However, the magistrate knows that the man is probably not guilty. She also knows that 
the mob’s rioting would cause more harm than the act of having the innocent man 
executed would. According to the principle of utility, she has a duty to execute the 
innocent man. However, it seems that the magistrate should not execute the innocent 
man. 
Intuitions elicited by thought experiments such as these (as well as intuitions 
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about real-world situations) seem relevant. Indeed, non-skeptics about morality generally 
agree that intuitions play an indispensable role in moral theorizing. Yet there is 
significant disagreement about the nature of intuitions and the exact role they should play 
in the justification of moral beliefs. Foundationalists claim our intuitions are relevant 
because intuitive beliefs serve as foundations for moral knowledge. By contrast, 
coherentists claim that intuitive beliefs are only relevant insofar as they have the proper 
relationships with other (moral and non-moral) beliefs held by the same agent.  
 
2.1 Intuitionism and Self-Evidence 
W. D. Ross’ moral theory is paradigmatically intuitionist and strongly 
foundationalist in structure. Ross posits a plurality of prima facie duties that are 
representative of general moral principles.
26
 These duties are prima facie in the sense that 
they are conditional upon the particular moral and non-moral facts of a given situation. 
Ross distinguishes one’s prima facie duties from one’s final duty. One’s final duty is 
one’s actual, all-things-considered moral duty; it is the duty upon which one should act. 
This distinction is necessary because, in many situations, there will be multiple 
conflicting prima facie duties in play, and only one of them can be one’s final duty. 
For our purposes, the important thing to notice about Ross’ theory is how one 
comes to know one’s prima facie duties. According to Ross, in order to be justified in 
believing that one has a particular prima facie duty (or in the moral principle 
representative of that duty), one need only to believe it on the basis of intuition. Hence 
one’s justification for believing prima facie duties and moral principles is non-inferential. 
                                                 
26
 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, “What Makes Right Acts Right?,” 1930, 
http://www.ditext.com/ross/right2.html (Accessed October 24, 2011) 
 19 
 
The reason intuitions are thought to be relevant is because the basic moral principles 
representative of our prima facie duties are supposed to be self-evident.
 
For Ross, this 
meant that basic moral principles are known as soon as they are understood.
 27
 Ross 
thought that moral principles are like basic mathematical axioms. If a person denies that 
the square root of four is two, that person must not understand the proposition ‘the square 
root of four is two.’ Analogously, Ross claims that if a person denies that it is prima facie 
wrong to lie, that person must not understand the proposition ‘it is prima facie wrong to 
lie.’ 
Since Ross holds that only way to be mistaken about moral principles is to 
misunderstand them, his theory seems to be an infallibilist variety of foundationalism 
about morality. According to Ross, if one does grasp the content of self-evident moral 
propositions, then one’s knowledge of them is certain. Because of the infallibilist 
character of this theory, there are good reasons to think that it is false. Besides facing the 
problems with infallibilism in general, Ross’ view has its own problems. One such 
problem is that moral beliefs do not seem like basic mathematical axioms. Contrary to 
Ross’ view, it seems that we can be mistaken about self-evident moral propositions while 
having a perfect understanding of those propositions. In other words, there seems to be 
room for genuine disagreement about moral propositions. Given his understanding of 
self-evidence, this is something Ross cannot admit. (He does leave room for 
disagreement about non-basic moral beliefs. We can be mistaken about our actual duties 
in particular cases because he does not claim that actual duties are self-evidently known.)  
Despite these problems, it might be possible to salvage Ross’ moral theory. 
Perhaps his views about the certainty of intuition can be weakened to such a degree as to 
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make them immune to these problems but still capable of providing a sufficient 
foundation for moral knowledge. As we have seen, Audi formulates a concept of self-
evidence that does not make claims to infallibility. Perhaps Audi’s views on self-
evidence make possible a sufficient, self-evident moral foundation (even though many of 
our non-moral beliefs probably do not rest on self-evident foundations).  
Like Ross, Audi maintains that there are multiple, irreducible moral principles 
and that these principles are self-evidently known on the basis of intuition. What makes 
Audi’s theory more plausible than Ross’ is that Audi distinguishes between being 
psychologically compelled to believe a self-evident proposition and being justified in 
believing a self-evident proposition.
28
 Given this distinction, it is possible for S to not be 
compelled to believe the self-evident moral proposition p even if S would be justified in 
believing that p if S were to believe that p. In other words, agents can adequately 
understand self-evident moral propositions but not be compelled to believe them. Hence 
Audi’s theory allows for the possibility of genuine disagreement about self-evident moral 
propositions. 
According to Audi, general moral principles and basic mathematical axioms are 
similar in that they are both self-evident. However, they differ in that moral principles are 
less compelling than mathematical axioms. To account for this difference, Audi holds 
that moral principles and mathematical axioms involve different kinds of self-evidence. 
Recall his distinction between mediate and immediate self-evidence. Moral propositions 
are probably mediately self-evident. Simple mathematical axioms are immediately self-
evident. In order to adequately understand and be justified in believing a self-evident 
moral proposition, one will probably have to draw inferences internal to that proposition. 
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This kind of inference making or reflection is meant to clarify moral concepts, thereby 
making moral principles more intuitive.
29
 Audi says that intuitions emerge from 
reflection instead of being conclusions from premises. 
According to Audi, intuitions must meet four requirements in order to be 
epistemically relevant—(1) the firmness requirement, (2) the comprehension 
requirement, (3) the pre-theoretical requirement, and (4) the non-inferential 
requirement.
30
 In order to satisfy (1), our intuitions must be held with sufficient 
conviction. In Audi’s words, “one must come down on the matter at hand.”31 (2) requires 
that the agent adequately understands moral propositions in order for their intuitions 
about moral propositions to be evidence for their truth. Satisfying (3) entails that one’s 
intuitions are not “evidentially dependent on theories nor themselves theoretical 
hypothesis.”32 This does not mean that intuitions are (or should be) pre-conceptual or 
completely independent from theorizing. It does mean that we would have moral 
intuitions even if we had no explicitly formulated moral theory and that these intuitions 
would be epistemically relevant. (4) restates what we have assumed from the beginning: a 
proposition’s being intuitive does not depend on that proposition being a conclusion. 
 Intuitions that meet these four requirements are supposed to be evidential in that 
they reliably indicate self-evident propositions. From this it follows that the agent’s 
intuitions themselves do not justify the agent’s foundational moral beliefs. What actually 
justifies an agent’s foundational moral beliefs is that their content is self-evident and that 
the agent has an adequate understanding of this content. One’s intuitions simply lead one 
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to believe self-evident propositions. (As we shall later see, this point is an important one.) 
 
2.2 Intuitions in Reflective Equilibrium 
 As with all beliefs, the coherentist holds that moral beliefs are justified by their 
relationships of mutual support (i.e., evidential consistency, connectedness, 
comprehensiveness, and explanatory coherence). According to the coherentist, if moral 
beliefs can be justified, such justification must consist in the successful systematization 
of an agent’s moral beliefs. Systematizing moral beliefs consists in systematizing 
intuitive propositions about particular moral cases and general moral principles. This 
systematization will probably result in the elimination or modification of at least some of 
(and possibly all of) one’s antecedent moral beliefs. The hope is that an agent will end up 
being justified in believing some comprehensive moral theory  
The conventional method of coherentist systematization is known as the method 
of reflective equilibrium (RE). There are two methods of reflective equilibrium; one is 
narrow and the other is wide. The method of narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) is 
simpler than the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE). NRE consists in making 
one’s beliefs about a given domain (i.e., a subset of an agent’s beliefs) coherent. In ethics, 
this requires an agent to consider her (relatively confident) moral judgments about 
particular cases alongside general principle(s) that she finds intuitively plausible.
33
 The 
point is to establish coherence between considered judgments and general principle(s) by 
eliminating or modifying inconsistent beliefs and increasing the supportive relationships 
between moral beliefs. For example, an agent’s considered judgments should probably be 
explained and supported by (a) more general principle(s), and her general principle(s) 
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should be explained and supported by her considered judgments.  
Since NRE is a coherentist method, none of one’s considered judgments or 
general principles can be set in stone. All of an agent’s moral beliefs must be revisable 
and non-basic. Even if perfect NRE is obtained at one point in time, an agent’s beliefs 
might be thrown into disequilibrium when he has relevant intuitions about new cases or 
newly considered principles. He might begin with a general moral principle and then be 
subject to various thought experiments or real-world moral situations. If the application 
of a general principle to a particular situation results in a moral judgment that seems too 
counter-intuitive to be true, then the agent should cease believing the principle, subtly 
alter the principle, or systematize his intuitions under an entirely different principle. On 
the other hand, the agent might decide to retain his original principle and reject his 
intuitions about that particular case. He might decide that the thought experiment or 
particular situation is an outlier, and that his intuitions about it are unreliable.  
One problem with NRE is that it might make the choice between moral theories 
indeterminate. That is, it will be possible to formulate many different sets of moral beliefs 
that are equally internally consistent and coherent but contain beliefs that are 
incompatible with beliefs in the other, equally coherent sets of moral beliefs. Because of 
this, NRE gives us little reason to think that our moral beliefs are true. A second problem 
with NRE is that it is impossible to formulate a coherent moral theory without including 
non-moral beliefs. To make moral judgments in particular situations, we need to be 
informed about the non-moral facts about that situation. That is, our non-moral beliefs 
inform our moral judgments. Many coherentists have opted for WRE in order to avoid 
problems such as these. 
 24 
 
WRE is similar to NRE in that the goal is to increase the coherence of a set of 
beliefs. However, WRE is obtained by considering not only those moral beliefs an agent 
finds intuitive, but also the relevant non-moral theories she is willing to endorse upon 
reflection.
34
 Arguments from relevant non-moral background theories are employed, 
perhaps causing a shift in one’s equilibrium point. If there is a shift in one’s initial 
equilibrium point, the agent must select among various new coherent moral belief sets (or 
become a moral nihilist). She must either revise her set of accepted moral judgments and 
principles, or revise the background theory in question. WRE is an attempt to increase the 
mutual justificatory relationships between our moral and non-moral beliefs. Specifically, 
it is meant to increase the comprehensiveness as well as the logical and explanatory 
connectedness of the considered belief set.  
Notice that WRE does not reduce moral beliefs to non-moral beliefs. One’s non-
moral beliefs will constrain and perhaps give independent support for one’s moral beliefs, 
and one’s moral beliefs will constrain and perhaps give independent support for one’s 
non-moral beliefs.
35
 However, background theories should not be mere generalizations of 
an agent’s moral judgments and principles. Background theories should be independent 
in the sense that they should give us relevant information about moral theories that moral 
judgments by themselves could not.
36
 For instance, Rawls’ theory of justice is 
constrained by his metaphysical views about personal identity, as well as his views about 
human psychology and society. Rawls also argues that utilitarianism assumes implausible 
metaphysical views about persons in that it assumes that people can have each other’s 
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experiences. According to Rawls, utilitarianism “does not take seriously the distinction 
between persons.”37 
One advantage of WRE is that it makes moral disagreement more tractable than 
NRE does. One can provide reasons for the differences between individual agents’ 
equilibrium points by tracing them back to disagreements about non-moral background 
theories. Moral disagreements would be very hard to resolve if we could only consult 
other moral beliefs of ours. Tracing disagreement to less controversial areas has the 
benefit of making agreement more possible because there will potentially be more ways 
to resolve disagreement.
38
 Another potential benefit of WRE is that it might give us a 
greater understanding of moral thought, which may, in turn, gives us constraints on the 
things we can legitimately cite as evidence for our moral beliefs.
39
 
Notice that intuition plays a prominent role in NRE and WRE. It seems that, in 
order to achieve reflective equilibrium, an agent’s intuitions need to meet Audi’s 
comprehension, firmness, pre-theoretical, and non-inferential requirements. It is obvious 
that an agent must have an adequate understanding of her considered judgments and 
accepted moral principles to achieve equilibrium. So it seems that an agent must meet the 
comprehension requirement. Achieving reflective equilibrium also requires “that we 
come down on the matter at hand.” The conviction one has in believing based on one’s 
intuitions is obviously relevant in achieving equilibrium. In fact, NRE can be interpreted 
as a method for discovering which moral propositions one has the most conviction in 
believing. In this respect, the method of reflective equilibrium has the firmness 
requirement. It is not as clear that achieving reflective equilibrium requires intuitions to 
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be pre-theoretical. In RE, an agent’s intuitions do precede the theory that emerges from 
the method in that the agent’s intuitions are used to construct that theory. Even in WRE, 
moral judgments are not derived from background theories. So, RE has the non-
inferential requirement insofar as it begins with intuitions that are, by their very nature, 
non-inferential. RE is unavoidably intuitionist in these respects.  
RE is thought to be a coherentist method because achieving a narrow or wide 
equilibrium turns on systematizing beliefs in order to increase their mutually supportive 
relationships (and because the intuitions considered are all held to be revisable and non-
foundational). However, the intuitionist nature of RE might be a problem. Ross and Audi 
explain the importance of our intuitions by tying them to self-evidence. In this way, they 
attempt to explain the reliability of moral intuitions. It may be objected that the 
coherentist proponent of RE gives us no explanation for the reliability of our moral 
intuitions.
 40
 We have not been given a reason to think that the intuitiveness of moral 
beliefs is relevant to their justification. According to this objection, we need a reason to 
give initial credibility to intuitions prior to including them in our moral theorizing.  
It seems the coherentist proponents of RE want intuitions to do the same sort of 
work that observations do in science. Observation reports are thought to be reliable yet 
capable of error. We sometimes have reason to think that our observations are unreliable. 
For example, I can trust my observation that that I am writing this paper under the 
assumption that I am awake, am not a brain in a vat, have not recently ingested LSD, etc. 
In other words, we can give causal explanations for observation reports and thereby know 
that they are reliable in normal situations. For example, if I were to knowingly ingest 
LSD, I would have a good reason to suspect that my sensory experiences do not reflect 
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reality. We know how vision works. Hence we know when not to trust it. The problem 
for the coherentist is that no such explanation has been successfully given for the 
reliability of our moral intuitions. And unlike vision and the other senses, there is no 
intuition faculty that can be located in the body and judged to be working properly or not.  
Daniels claims that the argument from the dis-analogy between moral intuitions 
and observation reports is a burden-of-proof argument. As such it “notices that the 
credibility we assign to observation reports is itself based on an inference from a non-
moral reflective equilibrium.”41 The problem, he suggests, is that we have not yet worked 
out a moral reflective equilibrium well enough to give us reason to trust (or not to trust) 
our moral intuitions. However, Daniels claims that there is no reason to think that such a 
reason will not be forthcoming. Indeed, this precisely what occurs in science. We use 
observations to support scientific theories, and these scientific theories give explanations 
for the credibility of our observations. Furthermore, even though we do not have a good 
positive reason for including our moral intuitions, we do know that, in some situations, 
moral intuitions are unreliable. For instance, an agent’s intuitions are unreliable if they 
are the result of bias and self-interest, or if the agent is unable to sympathize or empathize 
with other agents. 
 
3. Empirical Foundherentism 
Susan Haack argues that foundationalism and coherentism both fail to give us an 
adequate account of empirical justification. However, Haack is not a skeptic about the 
justification of our empirical beliefs. She argues against the dichotomy between 
foundationalism and coherentism and for a third theory—foundherentism. 
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Foundherentism accommodates the intuitions that motivate foundationalism and 
coherentism while avoiding their shortcomings. 
Haack’s strategy consists in giving several problems for foundationalism and 
coherentism and insisting that the only way to solve these problems is to move towards 
foundherentism. If the foundationalist and coherentist can solve these problems while 
remaining foundationalist and coherentist, they must do so by altering their theories to the 
degree that they “lack cogent rationale.”42 The alterations would have the effect of 
making both theories kinds of “proto-foundherentism.” These proto-foundherentist 
theories are better than the original foundationalist and coherentist theories. But, as the 
name ‘proto-foundherentism’ suggests, they actually indicate a better theory. This better 
theory is foundherentism.  
 
3.1 Against Coherentism 
 In Haack’s words, coherence theories maintain that “a belief is justified [if and 
only if] it belongs to a coherent set of beliefs.”43 Coherentists hold that the justification of 
any belief turns on its logical or quasi-logical relationships with other beliefs. The 
coherentist makes justification a purely evaluative matter. For the coherentist, the causal 
history of one’s beliefs is intrinsically irrelevant. Haack thinks that the purely evaluative 
nature of coherentism is the primary reason for its failure. 
Haack objects to the coherentist’s claim that the consistency of a set of beliefs 
justifies the beliefs in that set and that any inconsistency renders the entire set unjustified. 
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According to Haack, this is “too much to ask” of the agent.44 If justification requires 
complete consistency, nobody would have justified beliefs because nobody has 
completely consistent beliefs. Having even one pair of inconsistent beliefs is a problem 
because one can validly infer anything and everything that one can imagine from two 
inconsistent propositions. Since agents are justified in believing anything that they can 
validly infer from their justified beliefs, agents would be justified in believing anything. 
That consistency is a minimal condition for coherence makes the too much to ask 
objection even more salient.    
Justification probably does not require complete consistency. This is for the better 
because, according to Haack, it seems odd in the first place to think that a contradiction in 
one specific subset of an agent’s beliefs would render another unrelated beliefs 
unjustified. It seems that, even though “a justified belief will always be one enmeshed in 
a whole complex of other beliefs, nevertheless not all of a person’s beliefs are relevant to 
the justification of every belief of his.”45  
Haack also insists that consistency is not enough to ask. According to Haack’s 
“consistent fairy story objection,” the mere consistency of an agent’s beliefs is not 
enough to make it probable (to any degree) that the agent’s empirical beliefs are true.46 
Even if an agent is able to achieve complete consistency, the agent is still not justified in 
believing solely in virtue of that consistency. The problem is that it is possible for a 
completely consistent set of beliefs to have no connection with reality. Haack notes that 
adding further quasi-logical properties (e.g., comprehensiveness, explanatory coherence, 
etc.) to the mix does not help the matter. These are also evaluative properties, and, as 
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such, they do not ensure that an agent is connected to the world via experiential input.  
 The consistent fairy story objection indicates Haack’s basic problem with 
coherentism. This problem is that logical or quasi-logical properties alone do not ensure 
that our beliefs represent or map onto the world. They alone do not accommodate the 
intrinsic justificatory relevance of certain kinds of non-belief input. To be specific, 
coherentism cannot allow for causal input from the world (via experience) to have any 
direct role in the justification of our beliefs about the world. 
Haack gives ways in which coherentists can respond to the consistent fairy story 
objection. Consider her distinction between egalitarian and inegalitarian coherence 
theories.
47
 The egalitarian coherentist holds that all beliefs in a coherent set of beliefs are 
justified to the same degree. The inegalitarian coherentist, on the other hand, denies this; 
the inegalitarian coherentist holds that some beliefs in a coherent set can be more justified 
than others in that same set. Perhaps the inegalitarian coherentist can meet the consistent 
fair story objection by claiming that an agent’s beliefs about her experiences (or sensory 
states) are somehow justified to a higher degree than other beliefs in the same set. 
According to Haack, there are two ways in which coherentists can be 
inegalitarian.
48
 First, it can be claimed that S is more justified in believing that p than she 
is in believing that q because p has a higher degree-of-embeddedness in S’ belief set than 
q. Second, it can be claimed S is justified in believing that p to a higher degree than she is 
justified in believing that q because p is more heavily weighted than q. Roughly, to say p 
is more embedded than q is to say that more beliefs evidentially depend on p than on q. If 
more beliefs evidentially depend on a belief, then that belief is justified to a higher degree 
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than it would otherwise be. To claim that p is weighted is to claim that the intrinsic nature 
of p somehow gives it a greater degree of justification than other beliefs (regardless of 
how many beliefs depend on p). 
An empiricist version of degree-of-embeddedness coherentism might entail that 
S’ empirical beliefs are justified to a higher degree than her other beliefs because many of 
her other beliefs evidentially depend on her empirical beliefs. Nevertheless, according to 
Haack, this account suffers from the basic problem: it does not necessarily require the 
agent to have experiential non-belief input. A belief’s degree of embeddedness does not 
necessarily ensure that it is connected to the world. It just so happens that our empirical 
beliefs are highly embedded. It seems that experiential input is necessary for justification 
even if empirical beliefs happen not to be highly embedded in an agent’s belief set.  
An empiricist version of weighted coherentism would suggest that an agent’s 
beliefs about her sensory states are justified because their intrinsic empirical nature. 
BonJour’s coherentist theory might be weighted in virtue of his Observation 
Requirement. BonJour distinguishes between a belief’s being non-inferential in origin 
(and cognitively spontaneous), and a belief’s being non-inferential in justification. 
BonJour claims that no beliefs are non-inferential in justification. He claims that a 
cognitively spontaneous belief can only be justified insofar as one can formulate an 
argument that shows that specific kind of cognitively spontaneous belief to be reliable.
49
 
This, however, does not make it necessary that agents have experiential input; it only 
permits experiential input into the agent’s belief set, given that the agent is properly 
situated in the world. The purpose of the Observation Requirement is to make it 
necessary that agents have experiential input in order to be justified.  
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Haack gives two interpretations of the Observation Requirement—the doxastic 
interpretation and the experientialist interpretation. In her words, 
On the doxastic interpretation, the Observation Requirement requires that 
the subject believe that he has cognitively spontaneous beliefs, and that 
the subject believe that cognitively spontaneous beliefs are generally 
reliable. On the experientialist interpretation, it requires that the subject 
have cognitively spontaneous beliefs, and that he believe that cognitively 
spontaneous beliefs are generally reliable.
50
            
 
Haack thinks that the doxastic interpretation fails because it does not actually guarantee 
experiential input. She thinks that the experientialist interpretation might succeed, but, 
insofar as it does, it renders BonJour’s theory non-coherentist because it denies that 
justification is a purely doxastic and evaluative matter.  
Coherentism cannot adequately explain why experiential beliefs should have 
higher initial evidential or justificatory status than non-experiential beliefs. The reason 
for this failure is that the origin of a belief, according to coherentism, is intrinsically 
irrelevant to the justification of that belief. Since the inegalitarian versions of coherentism 
fail to meet the basic problem indicated by the consistent fairy story objection, they fail to 
give a satisfying account of empirical justification.  
 
3.2 Against Foundationalism 
We have said that foundationalism requires two kinds of beliefs—basic and non-
basic—and that justification flows one-directionally from basic beliefs to non-basic 
beliefs. There is no justification for non-basic beliefs that does not have its ultimate 
origin in basic beliefs. This definition of foundationalism is loose enough to be consistent 
with various sorts of foundationalist theories (in addition to the infallibilist and falliblist 
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theories that we have already discussed). As she does with coherentism, Haack 
distinguishes between various kinds of foundationalist theories and gives problems for 
each of these theories.  
First, Haack distinguishes between empirical and non-empirical versions of 
foundationalism.
51
 Since her theory is about the justification of empirical beliefs, she 
does not argue against non-empirical foundationalism. However, Haack has a somewhat 
broad notion of what is meant by ‘empirical.’ She says that ‘empirical’ “should be 
understood roughly as equivalent to ‘factual,’”52 and that “one must allow a coherentist, 
or for that matter a foundationalist of the non-experientialist stripe, the possibility of 
modifying the usual meaning of ‘empirical’ so as to detach ‘concerning how things are in 
the world’ from ‘depending on experience.’”53 In other words, empirical justification 
simply requires some sort of relevant non-belief input to ensure that an agent’s beliefs 
represent how things are in the world. Experiential input is just the usual sort of such 
non-belief input.  
Haack says that there are three ways in which empirical beliefs might be 
foundational—experientially, extrinsically, and intrinsically.54 Experientialist 
foundationalists claim that basic, foundational beliefs are justified by (but not inferred 
from) an agent’s sensory and introspective experiences. Extrinsic foundationalists claim 
that basic beliefs are justified “because of a causal or law-like connection between the 
subject’s belief and the state of affairs which makes it true.”55 Intrinsic foundationalism 
posits basic beliefs that are justified in virtue of their self-justifying content.   
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Haack further distinguishes between strong and weak foundationalist theories.
56
 
Strong experiential, extrinsic, and intrinsic foundationalists claim that all basic beliefs are 
completely justified on their own (i.e., without the support of other beliefs). Weak 
foundationalists claim that basic beliefs are justified only to some degree without the 
support of other basic beliefs.  
Finally, Haack contrasts pure and impure foundationalist theories.
57
 Pure 
foundationalists claim that non-basic beliefs must derive all of their justification from 
basic beliefs (in a transitive, linear fashion). In other words, justification is always 
transmitted from (weak or strong) basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs. Non-basic beliefs get 
every last bit of their justification from basic beliefs. Impure foundationalists, on the 
other hand, allow for mutual support among non-basic beliefs, but maintain that non-
basic beliefs must be inferred from basic beliefs. According to the impure foundationalist, 
non-basic beliefs must receive at least some of their justification from basic beliefs, but 
their degree of justification can be strengthened by their relationships with other non-
basic beliefs. Even for the impure foundationalist, non-basic beliefs would not be 
justified to any degree without being inferred from basic beliefs. 
Haack, of course, thinks that all kinds of empirical foundationalism fail. Intrinsic, 
self-justificatory foundationalism fails for the same reason that coherentism fails: it does 
not adequately accommodate the role that experience should play in the justification of 
our empirical beliefs.
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 To repeat, Haack maintains that our beliefs about the world can 
only be justified if we have some input from the world. (This bars self-evidence as an 
adequate basis for empirical justification.) In contrast to the intrinsic foundationalist, the 
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extrinsic foundationalist does attempt to account for the intuition some sort of non-belief 
input is intrinsically relevant to empirical justification. However, Haack argues that 
extrinsic foundationalism fails because it runs counter the view that “what justified a 
belief should be something of which […] the subject is aware.”59 
 We are left with the experientialist kinds of foundationalism. Haack’s first 
argument against these theories is called the “swings and roundabouts argument.” 60 The 
argument begins by noticing that foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be both secure 
and rich. The more secure a belief is, the more justified it is, independently of the support 
of other beliefs. The richer a foundational belief, the larger the superstructure is that it is 
able to support. According to Haack, the problem is that in order to fulfill one of these 
requirements, the other must be sacrificed. Very secure beliefs will probably not have 
enough content to support a large enough superstructure. Very rich beliefs will have more 
content, but will be less justified. An example of a secure but fruitless belief is the belief 
that the sun appears the way things appear to me now. Not much can be inferred from this 
belief. In contrast, the belief that the sun appears to rotate around the earth is a rich but 
less secure belief.  
Haack notes that the swings and roundabouts argument is  
less effective against weak foundationalism than against strong 
foundationalism (since the former does not require basic beliefs to be 
absolutely justified independently of the support of other beliefs), and less 
effective against impure foundationalism than against pure 
foundationalism (since the former does not require basic beliefs to do all 
of the work of supporting the superstructure of derived beliefs).
61
  
 
So the weak and impure versions of experientialist foundationalism remain. Haack’s next 
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arguments—the “up back and all the way down arguments”—have these remaining 
theories as their targets.
62
 According to Haack, the weak foundationalist is right to insist 
that some beliefs (i.e., experiential beliefs) are justified to some degree, but not 
completely.
63
 But it also seems that experiential beliefs are capable of being supported by 
non-basic beliefs. Consider my belief that I hear a police siren. Surely I am more justified 
in believing that I hear the siren if I know that my sensory organs are operating normally. 
The impure, weak foundationalist must either deny this, or give up on foundationalism in 
favor of foundherentism. Haack thinks that, once any amount of mutual support is 
permitted, there is no good reason for the impure foundationalist to deny that justification 
can go “back all the way down” from non-basic beliefs to basic beliefs.  
 
3.3 Towards Foundherentism 
Foundherentism consists of two ideas. One is coherentist in origin. It is the idea 
that all beliefs can be justified (in part) by mutual support. The other is foundationalist in 
origin. It is the idea that experiential input is necessary for the justification of our 
empirical beliefs. According to Haack, her theory is distinct from both coherentism and 
foundationalism because “a theory which allows non-belief input cannot be coherentist; a 
theory which does not require one-directionality cannot be foundationalist.”64 
Foundherentism combines the best aspects of foundationalism and coherentism into one 
unique theory; it acknowledges “the relevance of experience to justification, but requires 
no class of privileged beliefs justified exclusively by experience with no support from 
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other beliefs.”65 
To clarify Haack’s foundherentist theory, consider her analogy of a crossword 
puzzle. Just as the justification of a single belief depends, in part, on its coherent 
relationships with other beliefs, the plausibility of a potential entry in a crossword puzzle 
turns on how well that entry fits with other entries.
66
 And just like all of an agent’s beliefs 
would be unjustified if that agent were not to have experiential input, no potential entry in 
a crossword puzzle would be plausible if there were no clues. Haack notes that “the clues 
don’t depend on the entries, but the entries are, in variable degree, interdependent.”67 
Further, 
how reasonable one’s confidence is that a certain entry in a crossword 
puzzle is correct depends on: how much support is given to this entry by 
the cue and any intersecting entries that have already filled in; how 
reasonable, independently of the entry in question, one’s confidence is that 
those other already filled-in entries are correct; and how many of the 
intersecting entries have been filled in.
68
  
 
Weak, impure foundationalism and inegalitarian coherentism both move towards 
foundherentism, but they do not move far enough. Like the weak, impure foundationalist 
and the inegalitarian coherentist, the foundherentist acknowledges that justification 
admits of degrees. Weak, impure foundationalism posits basic beliefs that are justified to 
some degree but not completely; it also allows for mutual support among non-basic 
beliefs. This entails that beliefs can be justified to higher or lower degrees. The 
inegalitarian coherentist also maintains that beliefs are justified in differing degrees; 
some beliefs are more deeply embedded or more heavily weighted than others.  
According to Haack, the role of experience in justification is “to contribute its part 
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to the justification of all justified empirical beliefs, all of which can be, in varying 
degrees, justified in part by the support of other beliefs.”69 Thus foundherentism is able to 
sustain the intuition that justification admits of degrees better than the foundationalist or 
coherentist. It is the relationship between the logical and quasi-logical (coherentist) 
aspect of justification and the experientialist (foundationalist) aspect that gives rise to a 
theory of justification which entails that beliefs are justified to differing degrees.  
 
4.  Moral Foundherentism 
 Now that we have a sufficient understanding of foundherentism, we may consider 
what, if anything, it has to offer about the justification of our moral beliefs. It is obvious 
that we can construct a moral analogue to empirical foundherentism. It is not obvious that 
such an analogue will have any advantages over the traditional foundationalist and 
coherentist approaches to moral epistemology. In what follows, I will construct a moral 
analogue to empirical foundherentism and defend the plausibility of this theory. On moral 
foundherentism (MFH), moral intuitions play a similar justificatory role to that played by 
experience in empirical foundherentism. To motivate MFH, I will show that coherentist 
and foundationalist theories of moral epistemology face analogous problems to those 
faced by coherentist and foundationalist theories of empirical epistemology. Specifically, 
moral coherentists face a version of the consistent fairy story argument, and moral 
foundationalists face a version of the up back and all the way down argument.  
 
4.1 A Sketch of Foundherentist Moral Epistemology 
Recall that empirical foundherentism (FH) has two central elements. The first 
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element is the claim that an agent’s having experiential input is a necessary condition in 
order for her empirical beliefs to be justified to any degree.  The second element is the 
claim that all empirical beliefs are capable of having, and probably should have, 
relationships of mutual support with other beliefs. The first element is borrowed from 
foundationalism. The most plausible versions of empirical foundationalism claim that 
experience plays an essential role in justification. At the same time, the first element runs 
counter to a key claim of coherentism; it makes non-belief input necessary for empirical 
justification. The second element, on the other hand, borrows the coherentist concept of 
reciprocal justification. The second element runs counter to the foundationalist claim that 
basic empirical beliefs are “justified exclusively by the support of experience, 
independently of the support of other beliefs.”70  
Moral foundherentism (MFH) has two parallel elements. The first element is the 
claim that an agent’s having moral intuitions, and basing at least some of his moral 
beliefs on his intuitions, is a necessary condition for that agent’s moral beliefs to be 
justified to any degree. The second element is the claim that intuitive moral beliefs 
should be further justified by their relationships of mutual support with other moral and 
non-moral beliefs. The first element accommodates the intuitionist, foundationalist idea 
that our moral beliefs would not be justified if we did not have moral intuitions while 
rejecting the coherentist claim that intuitions are only a starting place for justification. 
According to MFH, if one has moral intuitions, but believes moral propositions unrelated 
to those intuitions, then (in contrast to coherentism) one’s moral beliefs would not be 
justified to any degree. The second element of MFH accommodates the coherentist (and 
anti-foundationalist) idea that there is no special class of moral beliefs incapable of being 
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further justified by having mutual relationships with other moral and non-moral beliefs.  
According to MFH, even though moral intuitions are a necessary aspect of the epistemic 
justification of moral beliefs, intuitive beliefs are all capable of being justifiably 
supported (and rejected) depending on their relationships with other beliefs. In other 
words, the justification of our intuitive moral beliefs can go “up and back all the way 
down.”  
Like FH, MFH accommodates the view that justification admits of degrees. Our 
intuitive moral beliefs are justified to some degree by their intuitive nature, but 
intuitiveness alone is not enough to make moral knowledge possible. The degree of 
justification of intuitive moral beliefs needs to be increased by their having coherent 
relationships with other (intuitive or non-intuitive) beliefs.  
Haack’s analogy of the crossword puzzle is helpful in explaining MFH. The 
intuitions supporting our moral beliefs serve as clues to the crossword puzzle that is 
moral inquiry. Without clues, there is no one correct way to fill out a crossword puzzle; 
there will be numerous, equally plausible ways to fill it out. Analogously, without 
intuition, there is no one correct coherent set of moral beliefs. A theory of moral 
epistemology that does not require moral intuition entails moral relativism. The 
plausibility of an entry in a crossword puzzle also depends on how well that entry fits 
with other entries. Analogously, how justified an agent is in believing any moral 
proposition depends (in part) on that belief’s relationships with other beliefs held by the 
same agent.   
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4.2  Defending Moral Foundherentism 
Unsurprisingly, the reasons for accepting MFH are analogous to the reasons for 
accepting FH. Recall Haack’s consistent fairy story argument. It states that coherentism 
cannot give an adequate account of empirical justification because coherentism makes 
justification solely an evaluative matter (i.e., a matter of relations among beliefs). There 
is no reason to think that a coherent set of beliefs with no experiential input will reflect 
reality. An analogous objection can be raised against moral coherentism. The coherentist 
cannot give an adequate account of the justification of our moral beliefs because the 
coherentist cannot permit non-belief input in the form of intuition. Having moral 
intuitions ensures that one’s moral beliefs reflect the moral facts. One could come up 
with various counter-intuitive but coherent moral theories. For example, an agent could 
be a coherent ethical (i.e., universal) egoist and claim that each person should act only in 
ways that promote his or her own interests. The coherentist has trouble showing why 
such theories are not justified.  
To see more clearly that this is a problem for the coherentist, consider Daniels’ 
response to the objection that we have no reason to give initial credence to our moral 
intuitions. According to Daniels, while it is true that we currently have no reason to 
require intuitions in moral theorizing, we also have no reason to think that such a reason 
is not forthcoming. Daniels thinks that WRE might give us such a reason. In my view, 
Daniels’ response faces the same objections that Haack levels at BonJour’s Observation 
Requirement.  
Recall that one interpretation of the Observation Requirement (OR1) makes it 
necessary that an agent actually has certain experiential states and believes that beliefs 
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based on those states are reliable in order for her empirical beliefs to be justified. The 
second interpretation (OR2) makes it necessary that the agent believes that she has 
experiences and that she believe that her experiences are generally reliable. The problem 
with OR1 is that, by definition, a theory that incorporates it cannot be kind of 
coherentism. It would really be a form of proto-FH. OR2, by contrast, is consistent with 
coherentism. However, it runs counter to the idea that experiential input is necessary for 
knowledge about the objective world.  
Moral coherentism (i.e., the method of reflective equilibrium) has what can be 
called the “Intuition Requirement.” In order to achieve reflective equilibrium, it seems 
that agents must start by consulting their intuitions. Hence it seems that, according to 
MRE, it is impossible for us to formulate a justified moral theory without relying on our 
intuitions. We can give two interpretations of the Intuition Requirement. One 
interpretation (IR1) requires an agent to actually have moral intuitions (and to believe 
them to be reliable) in order for his moral beliefs to be justified.  The other interpretation 
(IR2) requires an agent to believe that he has moral intuitions (and to believe his 
intuitions to be reliable). Any theory that incorporates IR1 is not genuinely coherentist. 
This is because intuitions, like experiences, are not kinds of beliefs. IR2 is consistent with 
coherentism. The problem, however, is that IR2 does not necessarily ensure that the agent 
actually has intuitions. Thus we should reject IR2. It is possible to falsely believe that 
some moral proposition is intuitive. In reality, that belief might be the result of habit, 
brain washing, or conformity.  
Recall BonJour’s distinction between a belief’s being non-inferential in origin 
(and cognitively spontaneous), and a belief’s being non-inferential in justification. 
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Intuitive beliefs are, like experiential beliefs, cognitively spontaneous in origin. BonJour 
denies that beliefs can be non-inferentially justified, and this is why BonJour has a 
problem with formulating a substantive version of the Observation Requirement. The 
moral foundherentist, like the empirical foundherentist, rejects the premise that no beliefs 
are non-inferentially justified. Therefore, the moral foundherentist does not face the 
dilemma that BonJour and the moral coherentist face. MFH accommodates IR1. 
Perhaps moral coherentism can be saved by claiming that intuitive moral beliefs 
are permissively justified. Daniels says that we have no reason to think moral intuitions 
are unreliable, and that we are therefore justified in including them in our moral 
theorizing. Maybe Daniels is relying on a notion of permissive justification. Perhaps our 
intuitive moral beliefs will not be positively justified until we have reason to think they 
are reliable. Daniels would be claiming that intuitive beliefs do positive justificatory 
work (even if they themselves are not positively justified).  
Notice that the coherentist can make this move and remain a coherentist because 
it maintains that intuitive moral beliefs are not justified by their intuitive nature. It is thus 
a virtue of MFH that it does not rely on a notion of permissive justification. According to 
MFH, our intuitive moral beliefs are positively justified by their intuitive nature from the 
get go. Nevertheless, intuitive beliefs can be justified to a greater degree if we come to 
have a reason to think that our intuitions are reliable (and then they are no longer basic or 
foundational). MFH entails that intuitive moral beliefs are justified to some degree, but 
that the full (or sufficient) justification for our moral beliefs comes later when they are 
made to cohere with the rest of our (moral and non-moral) beliefs. 
Because the most plausible version of it incorporates IR1, RE should be 
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considered a moral foundherentist method. Coherentism cannot allow our moral 
intuitions by themselves to do any justificatory work. MFH can and does. To see that this 
is a good thing, imagine two agents, S and A, that have the same (moral and non-moral) 
beliefs. This implies that S and A both believe that their moral beliefs are based on 
intuition. Imagine further that S actually has moral intuitions while A does not. It seems 
obvious that S’ moral beliefs are at least justified to a higher degree than A’s moral 
beliefs. According to the coherentist, this cannot be the case. (Of course, MFH entails 
something stronger—viz. that A’s moral beliefs are not justified to any degree.)  
Despite accommodating the foundationalist view that intuitive input is necessary 
for the justification of moral beliefs, MFH rejects the foundationalist view that 
justification is linear and transitive as well as the distinction between basic and non-basic 
beliefs. According to the moral foundationalist, non-basic beliefs are completely 
unjustified without the support of basic beliefs. And non-basic moral beliefs can never 
provide any extra support for basic, self-evident beliefs. This makes self-evidence (or 
something like it) necessary for foundationalism. MFH requires no concept of self-
evidence from which all of the justification for moral beliefs is transmitted. And this is all 
for the better because it seems intuitively possible for any kind of moral belief to provide 
support for another moral belief.  
MFH differs from moral foundationalism in that MFH allows for coherence to 
add justification to all moral beliefs. For instance, MFH allows for explanatory coherence 
between general moral principles and considered moral judgments. Moral judgments can 
be explained by certain general moral principles, and moral principles can be explained 
by our judgments. Even a modest foundationalist such as Audi cannot permit this. MFH 
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does not face the moral foundationalist’s problem of having to decide whether it is 
general principles or specific moral judgments that are basic; MFH leaves open the 
possibility for any of our moral beliefs to be justified by intuitive input.  
Another point in favor of MFH is that it makes more sense of (and allows for 
better resolution of) moral disagreement than foundationalism. Audi’s weaker notion of 
self-evidence (unlike Ross’ strong notion) makes genuine moral disagreement possible. 
However, it also makes such disagreement more difficult to solve. Seemingly self-evident 
beliefs are fallible. S can think p is self-evident and A can think that ~p is self-evident. 
According to Audi, the only potential way to solve this disagreement is for S and A to 
increase their understanding of p by reflection. Yet, after reflection, S and A might still 
disagree. MFH, on the other hand, can resolve disagreement by tracing it to less 
controversial areas and showing that either S or A have incoherence in their beliefs. This, 
of course, is the same way that the coherentist approaches disagreement, but MFH has the 
advantage of doing so while avoiding the problems with coherentism.  
Interestingly enough, intuitionist foundationalism also seems to face a version of 
Haack’s consistent fairy story objection. Any theory that appeals solely to self-evidence 
makes justification solely a doxastic, evaluative matter. In Haack’s terms, self-evidential 
foundationalism is a kind of intrinsic foundationalism. For the intuitionist foundationalist, 
intuitions are only relevant insofar as they compel one to believe self-evident 
propositions. It is conceptually possible for S to be justified in believing the self-evident 
proposition p on the basis of understanding alone without basing the belief that p on 
intuition. So, for the intuitionist foundationalist, intuitions are not intrinsically relevant to 
the justification of our moral beliefs.  
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4.3 Objections and Conclusion 
We have said that moral intuitions are neither beliefs nor experiences (i.e., that 
they are neither sensory nor introspective). One might conclude from this that intuitions 
are simply kinds of emotions, and that they are therefore irrelevant to epistemic 
justification. One problem with this conclusion is that it assumes that emotions cannot be 
good evidence for moral truth—a claim that the sentimentalist would deny. However, 
MFH is not committed to sentimentalism. The major problem with this objection is that 
to say that intuitions are neither beliefs nor experiences does not entail that intuition is a 
kind of emotion. To say that intuitions feel a certain way is not to say that they are 
emotions. It is simply to say that they have a distinctive phenomenological quality. To 
say that some moral proposition is intuitive could be interpreted to mean that it feels true, 
that one feels confident in affirming it, or that the proposition “makes sense.” And, unlike 
emotions (which, of course, also have a phenomenological quality), intuitions have 
propositional content. In this way they are quasi-doxastic, like experiences. 
Nevertheless, one might have the feeling that intuitions are not like experiences in 
the relevant way. According to FH, an agent’s beliefs about the world are justified only if 
the agent has experiences of the world. This is because our empirical beliefs need to be 
connected with reality. On FH, this connection is causal. One might objection that, on 
MFH, it is not clear how moral intuitions have a connection with that which makes moral 
beliefs true—viz., the moral facts. (Note that I do not take the term “moral fact” to imply 
moral realism.) 
This objection can be met by noticing that there are many possible ways for our 
moral intuitions to be connected to the moral facts. There are multiple realist options, two 
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of which allow moral intuitions (like experiences) to have an external causal connection 
with the moral facts. First, the non-naturalist realist would claim that there is a direct 
causal connection between moral properties and intuitions. For example, according to this 
view, my intuition that charity is virtuous is directly caused by the moral property of 
goodness. Second, the naturalist realist can claim that my intuition about charity is caused 
by moral properties that supervene on non-moral, natural properties. This is to say that 
my intuition is caused by the natural features that make charity good (e.g., that it tends to 
promote the wellbeing of those in need). A third realist option is to explain the relevance 
of intuition by appealing to self-evidence. Self-evidence can be made consistent with 
MFH by claiming even self-evident beliefs can be supported by other moral beliefs that 
are not self-evident.   
The non-realist can also give an account of how our moral intuitions can do 
justificatory work independently of their coherence with other beliefs. For the non-realist, 
the connection that intuitions have with the moral facts will not be externally causal in 
character. This is because the non-realist claims that morality is mind-dependent. And if 
morality is mind-dependent, it makes perfect sense for our intuitions (which are products 
of our minds) to be intimately connected with the moral facts. This would be to claim that 
moral intuitions are like mathematical intuitions. That is, the non-realist might explain the 
relevance of moral intuitions by appealing to certain canons of rationality. A kind of 
Kantian constructivism could give an account for how moral intuitions connect to the 
moral facts.  
MFH is consistent with each of these accounts. MFH need not be exactly 
analogous to FH in terms of the kind of connection our intuitions have to the moral facts. 
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MFH leaves the causal origin of our intuitions open. Intuitions need not be like 
experiences in their causal origin in order for intuitions to play an analogous role in 
justification. In fact, it is a virtue of MFH that the exact connections between intuition 
and moral truth are left open precisely because there are many plausible explanations for 
the justificatory relevance of our intuitions. If moral realism is true, our intuitions might 
have a causal source external to our minds similar to that of experiences. If moral realism 
is not true, our intuitions might be explained by certain features of our minds.  
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